Realpolitik and India

By Anita Inder Singh,

Multi-aligned India is dependent on America’s foes China and Russia for trade, arms, and oil, respectively. For India, the greatest use of the US is against China, which threatens its territorial integrity and its influence in the immediate South Asian neighbourhood. Paradoxically, India is dependent on both Russia and the US to counter China.

Unfortunately, India is paying Russia $84 per barrel, which is more than the $60 price cap set by the G7. The problem is that Russia has accumulated a surfeit of rupees through its old rupee trade with India and refuses to accept more. So, India has had to pay Russia for oil in UAE dirham, US dollars, and Chinese yuan. India’s longstanding defence tie with Russia is also in trouble.

Arms deliveries from Russia—including parts for the S-400 Triumf missile—have stalled since the outbreak of the Ukraine war. Moscow asked Beijing for weapons in 2022—though China has denied giving Russia arms. But Russia has had to procure drones from Iran and artillery rounds from North Korea. Unsurprisingly, India’s top military officers have stressed the need to find replacements for Russian equipment and to indigenise India’s arms industry.

India has diversified its arms retailers—and Moscow understands that. But even “post-Ukraine”, the US and France together cannot replace weapons from a war-weakened Russia, especially the S-400 Missile. The US could help India by jointly manufacturing the Stryker armed vehicles, but that is a small part of India’s drive for self-sufficiency which could take at least two decades to achieve. The additional problem is that the US will not transfer its most sensitive technology to a non-ally.

The ongoing unpleasant exchanges over whether Delhi was involved in a plot to kill a Sikh separatist abroad reveal how easily the Indo-US relationship could be strained. The US is unlikely to dump India because, at the very least, India offers strategic facilities. But the rhetoric about shared values cannot mask the question whether it will trust India as the only non-aligned strategic partner in the Quad, against China. Essentially, that will decide whether it will give India indispensable technology and capital to empower it to make the transition from a low income to a higher per capita economy. Technological cooperation is possible under the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (2022). But any tech cooperation with Russia—China’s main tech partner—will go against India in Washington. So it will become more challenging for New Delhi to cope with the growing dependence of Russia’s wartime economy on China for high tech.

India is not the US’ main strategic partner in the Indo-Pacific, as was shown in 2021 by the creation of AUKUS which included Australia, the UK, and the US, who bolstered their post-1945 Cold War alliance with a commitment to create a new fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, aimed at countering China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific. In contrast, Washington has refused to give India n-subs. AUKUS took Delhi by surprise because it marked the secondary importance of India to the US in Asia. In fact, Washington has perceived ASEAN and the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation group as the centre of the Indo-Pacific, not India.

Another longstanding US ally in the Indo-Pacific is Japan—which is Asia’s main rising power. Japan’s GDP per capita—$33,823.6—is nearly three times that of China; India’s is $2,389. Japan has the educational and technological skills necessary to compete successfully with China. Because it has shifted from its pacifist stance and will increase defence spending, it could become the world’s third-largest defence power within the next five years.

Russian help to India for countering China is limited. It is China’s junior partner in their relationship and heavily dependent on China economically as an investor and energy buyer. They make common cause against the US’ Asian and global primacy. So India cannot “divide” them by buying Russian oil. Instead, China and Russia have welcomed India’s ‘neutrality’ on Ukraine in the United Nations. So, India needs to craft a strategy to counter their divisive machinations.

Economically, the tie with the US is advantageous to India. The US is the largest single buyer of India’s exports—18%. Russia purchases 0.66 %, even less than China, which buys 3.4%. In 2022-23, India-Russia trade amounted to about $50 billion; India-US trade was worth $188 billion.

India is in the unenviable position of being highly dependent on China’s friend, Russia, for weapons to safeguard its territorial sovereignty, and on Russian oil for its economy, while relying on the US military presence in Asia to keep China at bay in the Indo-Pacific. But realpolitik will dictate China’s aggressiveness. The impact on Russia itself of its illegal onslaught on Ukraine will highlight the salience of the US as India’s top strategic and economic partner in 2024.

(The author is Founding professor, Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, New Delhi)